Quem é Paul Rogers?
Paul Rogers é Professor de Peace Studies pela Universidade de Bradford, trabalha na área de segurança internacional, controle de armas e violência política há mais de trinta anos, e é um editor de Segurança Internacional para o openDemocracy. Ele também escreve um briefing mensal para o Oxford Research Group. Rogers já escreveu e editou mais de 26 livros, entre eles: “Why We Are Losing The War on Terror” e “Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”.
Sobre o livro.
Este livro oferece uma visão idealista (dentro do que o termo significa no estudo das Relações Internacionais), crítica ao conceito de segurança internacional como interpretado por membros da Realpolitik, e ligada à noção de Segurança Humana da ameaça constituída pelo Daesh ou ISIS (você pode ler a minha crítica à Segurança Humana aqui). É uma análise com a qual eu discordo em muitos pontos, mas que, ainda sim, considero relevante e interessante para qualquer leitor que deseja entender as ameaças oriundas de atores não-estatais violentos ou grupos terroristas.
O livro “Irregular War: ISIS and The New Threat from the Margins”, escrito por Paul Rogers, é divide em oito capítulos: “ordem mundial ou desordem: ISIS e os novos produtores de conflitos”, “vindo do nada”, “narrativas conflitantes e o ambiente para a revolta”, “armas de destruição em massa e violência política”, “ISIS e o seu futuro”, “guerra irregular”, “um planeta furioso?” e “uma possível paz”. Acredito que esse livro ainda não está disponível em português. Eu vou escrever, abaixo, um resumo constituído pelos aspectos mais relevantes deste livro para que você possa entender os argumentos do autor. Contudo, se este assunto lhe interessar, sugiro que você compre o livro de Paul Rogers ou leia outros de temática semelhante.
CAP I. ORDEM MUNDIAL OU DESORDEM:
ISIS E OS NOVOS PROVOCADORES DE CONFLITO
Nesse capítulo, Paul Rogers introduz a sua ideia fundamental: a de que o ISIS (ou Daesh) é parte de um fenômeno muito maior de “revolta das margens”.
“[This book] does not regard Islam as the fundamental issue for the coming decades and is more concerned with the risk that we are moving into na “age of insurgence” – rather than one of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Islamic World – and towards a global environment of fragility, instability, increasing violence and irregular war. This can be avoided, but not if the world elites, and specially the states in the North Atlantic community, continuing with their posture of maintaining control by traditional means.”
“This book will argue that although ISIS is certainly the major security problem, the real drivers of current global insecurity are quite different: deepening socio-economic divisions, which lead to the relative marginalization of most people across the world, and the prospect of profound and lasting environmental constraints, caused by climate change. ISIS, in short, should be seen as a warming of what could be to come, not as a fundamental trend in its own right.”
“The fundamental drivers of conflict – economic marginalization and climate change – are exacerbated by two other factors. One is that a whole raft of welcome improvement in education and literacy is making far more people aware of their own marginalization and unwilling to accept it, and the other is that there is an assumption in the west that security can best be assured, when other methods fail, by resort to military responses. This is greatly aided by the power and influence of what President Eisenhower described as the ‘military – industrial complex’, but is better described as the ‘military – industrial – academic – bureaucratic complex’. At its crudest level, what is sometimes termed the ‘control paradigm’ might better be termed ‘liddism’: keeping the lid on problems rather than understanding their causes and manifestations (ROGERS, 2016).”
Como o autor define “control paradigm”? “[It] sees military force as the ultimate guarantor of security for the world’s more powerful societies, [it] remains in place in spite of the huge problems that continue to face it. On present trends, decades of war in the Middle East are in prospect (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP II. “VINDO DO NADA”
Neste capítulo, o autor explora elementos que fazem parte do cenário geopolítico que contribuíram para o ambiente que levou ao surgimento do ISIS, bem como outros grupos não-estatais violentos que antecederam o Daesh. Aqui aparecem: Al-Quaeda, a guerra no Iraque, elementos relacionados à guerra ao terror durante a administração Bush e o conflito entre Israel e os palestinos.
“Finally, there is the Israeli connection, which again has a much wider resonance than is realized. Israel may feel constantly threatened and be determined to ensure its security by all means necessary, but this determination, with its consequences to the Palestinians, is a running sore of tension right across the region. Many of the regional autocrats have long been happy to see the plight of the Palestinians draw attention away from their own repression, since the Israelis were always there to blame and therefore served a useful purpose. For Israel, too, dealing with its neighboring autocracies was in many ways preferable to responding to regimes that were representative of wider opinion. Yet the reality was that Israel’s control of Islam’s Third Holy Place (Jerusalem, known in Arabic as al-Quds) was a source of enduring anger, something that also encompassed deep opposition to US support for Israel. This is the reason that, when the Pentagon turned to IDF for advice and equipment in late 2003, it had a far greater effect than was realized in the West, where it was scarcely even reported.”
“Why bother? Can we not just accept that extreme movements will rise and must be defeated, especially if they gain control of territory and have the potential to develop WMD (weapons of mass destruction)? The answer is that we need to bother if we are to have any chance of understanding the need for radically new approaches. The War on Terror may have been a failure, but the ‘control paradigm’ – the imperative of maintain control – remains at the root of the Western approach to security (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP III. NARRATIVAS CONFLITANTES E O AMBIENTE PARA A REVOLTA
Neste capítulo, Paul Rogers argumenta que existem narrativas conflitos que transformam qualquer análise sobre grupos terroristas em uma guerra de nós versus o outro. E, para se combater o terrorismo é essencial entender o terrorismo como uma consequência ou manifestação de um problema, e não a raiz do mesmo.
“One of the ongoing problems for any Western observer trying to understand the sudden rise of ISIS and other extreme movements, such as al-Quaeda, Boko Haram or the Naxalites, is the difficulty with coming to terms with how ‘we’ (that is, the West) are perceived. There is almost always an assumption that the countries of the West are ‘the good guys’ who behave in a civilized way, even in the face if appalling brutality and sheer terrorism. This is not a peripheral issue, since it lies at the heart of how the major Western states see the earlier rise of al-Quaeda and the more recent development of ISIS (…). If we are to make sense of the motivations and attitudes of supporters of extreme movements, we need to recognize and accept the existence of very different world views (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP IV. ARMAS DE DESTRUIÇÃO EM MASSA E VIOLÊNCIA POLÍTICA
Neste capítulo, o autor do livro análise a possibilidade de atores não-estatais violentos adquirirem armas químicas, biológicas, radiológicas ou nucleares. Devemos realmente nos preocupar com isso ou tal ameaça seria apena algo do mundo dos cinemas? Neste capítulo ele também cita, brevemente, a possibilidade de que o Irã adquira armas de destruição em massa.
As armas de destruição em massa podem ser consideradas uma ameaça existencial?
“There is no accepted definition of the term ‘existential threat’ when applied to paramilitary violence, but it is normally held to be an action which can threaten the existence of a state, or at least a major center of population. To be more specific, ‘existential’ implies, at least, catastrophic destruction to the extent that many decades, if not a century or more, would be needed for recovery … many critics said Iran could become an existential threat to Israel, and it is true that such a small country, with barely a dozen large towns and cities, could be devastated by perhaps 20 nuclear weapons if they could evade defences and if the attacker were confident that it would not, in return, be destroyed. One of the ironies of the criticism of Iran is that only one country in the region, Israel, has nuclear weapons, so the Iranians could consider Israel to be a threat to them and not the other way around (ROGERS, 2016).”
No que tange ao risco de atores não-estatais violentos, como o Daesh, adquirirem armas biológicas, Paul Rogers escreve:
“It would be possible for an established state to provide bio-agents such as anthrax to a sub-state group, but the risk to that state if this were proved would be considerable. Of greater concern is a situation in which an extreme group is able to take over and maintain control of a substantial territory for long enough to bring together the expertise and technical competence necessary to stablish a chemical – or biological-weapons programme. This is far from beyond the bounds of possibility (…). So there is a potential threat of the use of some chemical – or biological – warfare agents, and also from radiological devices, from a group such as ISIS, although at its worst this might involve deaths in the hundreds or possibly low thousands rather than an existential risk to a state. The greater issues are the fear factor and what such use would mean for a political commitment to act against ISIS (ROGERS, 2016).”
No que tange ao risco de atores não-estatais violentos adquirirem armas nucleares, o autor do livro escreve, entre outras coisas, que existe o risco de um Estado dar armas nucleares à um grupo terrorista e que, apesar desta possibilidade improvável, ela deve ser levada em consideração. Tal análise coloca o autor no lado oposto do tabuleiro em relação aos estudiosos de Relações Internacionais tais como Waltz, um Realista.
“To this extent, producing nuclear weapons from scratch is beyond the capability of any sub-state group that currently exists. If, in the future, and extremist group were to maintain control of territory that included reasonably advanced industries, and were able to bring together the expertise necessary and to identify a source of uranium, then it might be possible to produce nuclear weapons, but that is still a long way off.”
“There remain two other ways. One is to buy or steal weapons-grade uranium or even a complete weapon. While there are concerns about this in the chaos that followed the collapse of the Soviet economy in the early and mid-1990s, these have diminished substantially, although if societal breakdown were to occur in an existing nuclear-weapons state such as North Korea or Pakistan, there would be huge fears for the security of nuclear arsenals. The other risk is that a state could supply a sub-state group, possibly because it was of political value to the state to do so. While highly unlikely, this has to be considered given the very existence and continued development of nuclear weapons.”
“This limited threat from WMD cannot be described as ‘existential’ in the proper sense of the word, but in a narrower sense it might be. Given the greater fear of chemical and especially biological weapons, the use of such weapons by a group such as ISIS would lead to a hugely increased demand for tighter security, for more surveillance, less acceptance of difference and a severe escalation in Islamophobia. It could impact and alter current political systems, including what in other circumstances would be seen as wholly unacceptable infringements of human rights. In other words, the existential threat to our more or less democratic societies would come not from the actions of extremists but rather from the reactions of our own politicians and media (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP V. O ISIS E O SEU FUTURO
Neste capítulo, Paul Rogers analisa a ideologia e a infraestrutura do ISIS. Em alguns trechos desse livro, em especial deste capítulo, o ISIS parece uma força paramilitar invencível. Como o próprio Rogers escreve, este grupo seria uma “força paramilitar muito competente que vai ser difícil derrotar”. É irônico ler isso após saber das recentes vitórias militares da coalização liderada pelos Americanos. Tirando esse aspecto irônico do texto, o capítulo V desse livro é um ótimo e didático resumo dos aspectos relevantes sobre o ISIS para qualquer análise.
Quais eram as fontes de renda para o ISIS?
“Of even greater use to ISIS was the fact that, in recent times, the whole region has become a haven for smuggling, with a huge array of produce and consumer goods as well as oil and processed petroleum products, moving between northern Syria, northern Iraq and Turkey, with Iran also involved. Most if not all of the borders were porous, with numerous back routes available, but smuggling was, even so, a ready source of income for the movement, as those involved were willing enough to pay tolls for permission to move their goods.”
“ISIS had other sources of supply. These included financial support from abroad, particularly sympathetic wealthy individuals in western Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, and it also had unexpected but very welcome windfalls, notably more than $400 million in Iraqi currency that was looted from banks when Mosul was taken ISIS (ROGERS, 2016).”
Qual a diferença entre o ISIS e a al-Quaeda?
“The difference concerns the two major organization’s territorial ambitions. Al-Quaeda has been focused mainly on the revolutionary downfall of the unacceptable regimes of the Arab-Islamic world, the so-called ‘near enemy’. In a sense it has been territorial in its outlook, but in a state-centered manner. The overthrow of existing regimes and their replacement by acceptable Islamist alternatives have been at the core of its thinking, and the support for the Taliban regime in the mid- and late 1990s was an obvious example of this. Destroy unacceptable regimes, replace them with ‘proper’ regimes, and the revolution will spread outwards. At some state the caliphate will be established.”
“For ISIS, the fundamental policy is radically different, and this got its clearest expression in the very early establishment of the caliphate by al-Baghdadi, with himself as the new caliph, in the Mosul mosque in June 2014. ISIS does not relate to an existing state, but has been carved out from territory that stretches across two states, ones that its protagonists remind us were ‘Crusader creations’ following the Anglo-French Skyes-Picot reorganization of the post-Ottoman Middle East during World War I. The symbolism of establishing a caliphate should not be underestimated. From the perspective of its leadership it is a hugely important development, one that represents a direct challenge to the international status quo in which the region is controlled by outsiders. In their eyes it represents a seismic change in the worlds affair (ROGERS, 2016).”
O ISIS pode ser considerado um Estado como a sigla sugere? Seria este um Estado pós-westfaliano ou, para se ser um Estado, é necessário estar dentro do sistema de Estados Westfaliano? Paul Rogers não responde essas perguntas diretamente, contudo ele sugere que o ISIS poderia ser considerado um Estado.
“Perhaps most important of all is that regard are two elements that are commonly overlooked: bureaucracy and law. The indications are that in terms of political organization, ISIS has a working bureaucracy that underpins its technocratic competence, and that this bureaucracy is sufficiently robust to survive a substantial level of military action against it. ISIS also has a legal system, dealing not just with crime but with a variety of civil disputes. In short, ISIS may be an extreme Islamist paramilitary movement that is dependent on often brutal control, but it is rooted in a functioning state. It is not alone in this: parts of rural Afghanistan operate in this way, where there is a largely acceptable system of courts; the same has been true in Somalia, and remains so in those areas still controlled by al-Shabaab, and even in north-eastern Nigeria there is some order among disorder (ROGERS, 2016).”
O que é wahhabismo e o que esta ideologia tem haver com o ISIS?
“A second long-term factor that has indirectly aided the rise of ISIS, and will help determine its future prospects, in the promulgation of the Wahhabi tradition by Saudi Arabia over several decades. The origins of this tradition lie with one of the most noted Islamic scholars of the early fourteenth century, Ibn Taymiyyah. His most relevant belief in the current context was that Islam must remain true to the very earliest days of the faith, in the seventh century CE. His thinking was developed by Muhammad ibn Abdal-Wahhab in the eighteenth century, in what is now Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism stems from the latter’s teachings and is the strongest religious orientation within present-day Saudi Arabia, as well as the ideological inspiration for the expansion of Saudi influence over most of Arabia. It can be described as a puritanical form of Salafi Islam, which seeks its inspiration from the earliest days of the faith and which itself is deeply conservative. This is an interpretation in which Allah is at the centre of worship, which eschews reverence for all others, practices an austere lifestyle and diminishes the status of women. Many Muslims would argue that this is not the true representation of the earliest days of Islam, but Wahhabism does attract considerable support (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP VI. A GUERRA IRREGULAR
Aumento do número de operações secretas utilizando forças especiais, aumento das investigações dentro do Estado (law enforcement), e investimentos em tecnologias de vigilância (remote control warfare, uso de drones e transferência de tecnologia para a sociedade civil). Todos esses são sinais de que vivemos hoje uma guerra irregular ou assimétrica contra atores não-estatais violentos. Neste capítulo, Paul Rogers explica e fornece exemplos das mudanças estratégicas e tecnológicas envolvidas nas guerras irregulares atualmente, bem como análise o impacto dessas tecnologias e estratégias no cenário internacional do qual surge o terrorismo.
“From the perspective of governments that have been involved in wars since 2001 with radically different consequences to the successes originally anticipated, the progressive move towards war by remote control has many advantages. These include relatively low cost, far lower casualties, far less media attention and consequent unwelcome visibility, greater deniability and far lower risk of debate.”
“In the absence of information there is less likely to be informed media coverage of what is happening within conflicts, and consequently less chance to debate and question the conduct of wars. There will, instead, be an assumption that the approach is correct and likely to be successful. There is already at variance with the experience of drone attacks in recent years because of the manner in which they lead to a profound anger and resentment within communities on the receiving end.”
“By any analysis the War on Terror has been a conspicuous failure, but it continues as what appears to be the only way forward. Boots on the ground may have been replaced by remote-control warfare, but the solution is seen in Western security circles almost entirely as the use of intense and persistent military force, with little attention paid to the underlying reasons why the wars have developed. It appears more and more to be a case of keeping the lid on, rather than of turning down the beast – ‘liddism rules OK’ – and there is very little sight of any serious thinking (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP VII. UM PLANETA FURIOSO?
Neste capítulo, Paul Rogers explora o que seriam as “margens” que estão se revoltando, porque estão se revoltando e crítica o fato de que nos meios acadêmicos dedicados ao estudo de segurança e estratégia existem poucas discussões sobre os fatores, entre ele o socioeconômico, que contribuem para o ambiente de insegurança e para as guerras irregulares.
“Their [members of a seminar on security risk] was not with the reasons for the weakness or failures of states and how to prevent them from becoming problems in the future, but with how to handle the consequences. The issue was essentially one of treating symptoms rather than causes, bearing in mind that their professional roles were, after all, to defend the realm.”
“Looking beyond the problems, at how to prevent them in the first place, was not really part of their job. This is not a reflection on their professionalism, or indeed that other elements for the security apparatus, but it does point to a serious gap in our analysis of the problems that lie ahead. It does not seem to be sufficiently in our nature to do otherwise (ROGERS, 2016).”
O que são as “margens” que dão título ao livro?
“What we are talking about here is not a minority fringe that is consistently excluded from the benefits accruing to most of society, but the majority of people, who are sharing inadequately the benefits of distorted economic growth. They are what should be thought of as the ‘majority margins’: not so much the people who are desperately poor, but the far larger number who may be educated, literate and all too well aware of the state of society and that they have seriously limited life chances (ROGERS, 2016).”
Neste capítulo, o autor também análise como as mudanças climáticas influenciam a segurança internacional.
“In the context of international security, there are three key points to consider. One is that the rate of climate change appears to be accelerating, especially in some regions such as the Arctic and the northern subtropics. The second is that the entire process is proving to be markedly asymmetric. The most commonly accepted prognosis is that this trend will persist and that, the tropics and subtropics, with substantially more warming on land than over the oceans. Furthermore, there are predicted to be changes in rainfall patterns, marked by a relative increase over the oceans and polar regions and a decline over tropical and subtropical land masses. Third, there is expected to be an increase in severe weather events, whether they be storms, floods, droughts or intense heatwaves (ROGERS, 2016).”
CAP VIII. UMA POSSÍVEL PAZ
Neste capítulo, Paul Rogers resume as principais ideias no livro, defende uma transição de um conceito de segurança tradicional para o conceito de segurança humana (leia mais sobre esses dois conceitos de segurança aqui), defende a promoção do trabalho de atores não-estatais que não sejam violentos e destaca a importância de apreciar a considerável experiência adquirida em relação à mediação, resolução de conflitos e peace-building, seja entre os países ou através de organizações internacionais como as Nações Unidas.