Como terminar uma guerra?

“No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” – Clausewitz.




Quando se decide estudar sobre guerras um dos primeiros autores que surgem é Tucídides. Este era um filosofo grego que escreveu “The History of the Peloponnesian War”. Neste livro, o filosofo grego em questão narra a mais importante guerra do período no qual viveu e escreve sobre as lições que podem ser tiradas a partir deste evento para os estudiosos de relações internacionais. Como um relato tão antigo ainda pode ser considerado relevante atualmente?

“From a particular event, universal truths can be found that are useful for all mankind to know. Lessons about the tendencies of human nature can be culled from particular events and can be applied to others. Specifics may change, but the underlying principles and stimuli will remain fundamentally similar. Because of the fundamental immutability of human nature, we know that situations in politics will remain fundamentally the same (POLING, 2009)”.

A partir dos relatos de Tucídides, pode-se dizer que os países vão para guerra por três razões: por medo, por honra, e por interesse, sendo o medo a mais desculpável das três justificativas. Ninguém pode negar o direito de uma nação de se defender. Outra lição que pode-se tirar dos textos deste filosofo é o que ficou conhecida como “a armadilha de Tucídides”; a lição de que o surgimento de uma nova potência na arena internacional causa medo na potência que se encontra no poder, o que leva as duas potências ao conflito.

“The Spartans feared the Athenian power and resorted to the cry of justice to cloak their self-interest. On the contrary, the Athenians claim that those who are powerful never bring justice to gain anything for they do not have the need for that claim. They did not deny the existence of justice in international relations, but they did deny its applicability in all situations. Justice plays an important role in settling arguments, but only when it can be used among equals. Otherwise, it is appealed to by the weaker party to protect themselves from the stronger party. (…) The powerful do not have to cloak their true meaning in the idea of justice or with excuses. The powerful can speak freely and openly of their actions to anyone – even if they are not the ruling class of the polis (POLING, 2009)”.
“Once nations begin to going back in history to justify foreign policy, there is no turning back. And endless cycle of past misdoings are brought up and tossed back and forth between the parties. All the while, both parties, know that these past offenses have absolutely nothing to with the resolution of the current issue at hand. Ultimately, it is hard to resolve anything when going back in history (POLING, 2009)”.
“This act demonstrates the power of Athens. Their ability to be frank in an international debate demonstrates that they have the power to do so. The weak tend to avoid such frankness out of fear of retaliation for what was said (POLING, 2009)”.
“The guiding forces for interaction between foreign nations are difficult to determine and decipher. This difficulty is due to the need to interpret what nations say and what they mean. There is a level of uncertainty in human affairs – human beings can conceal true thoughts from one another; they may even be unclear themselves of what their true motivations are. One may believe to know the positions of all parties, but this is always clouded with ambiguity because people can lie. Finding the truth beneath the statements and arguments proves to me more difficult. This guide is the impulse or motivation for action; at other times, it can be the case made by a nation to justify its actions. The true guide used by a nation – its true cause – is often hidden behind its cause in speech. The true cause is not always what nations claim to be their guide for action (POLING, 2009)”.



“War Termination” é o processo ou ato de parar um conflito. O planejamento para tal processo é o planejamento civil, ou seja, os detalhes de como a parte vencida vai ser administrada após a rendição do inimigo e o fim das hostilidades. Note que, enquanto o conflito armado durar, a diplomacia está subordinada às necessidades militares.

“Broadly construed under this definition, planning and executing war termination can cover a lot, from planning before a war starts to the negotiations following a truce. Narrowly construed, war termination might be the process of deciding when and how to stop the fighting when it comes evident that war fighting objectives have been met or, perhaps, are no longer achievable. Either way, the concept can be applied to conflicts ranging from thermonuclear war to low intensity conflict. (…) While war might be ended by the exhaustion or disappearance of one of the belligerents – and event – war termination as a process implies that fighting can be stopped before exhaustion or annihilation of one of the both belligerents. In this latter sense, war termination is a political choice. It is a cost-avoidance process employing a rational approach, a rational relating of objectives and the measures to achieve them. It is this process that begs examination (BADE, 1994)”.

A Doutrina Ameriacana de War Termination é mínima, pois se assume que não se pode planejar o processo de finalização de um conflito até que as forças Americanas ganhem tal conflito.  Além disso, é esperado que o conflito termine com a derrota militar decisiva do adversário. Os críticos desta doutrina mínima destacam que um dos principais fatores que um dos fatores que dificultam o fim de conflito é a falta de definição prévia dos objetivos, ou seja, do que se planeja alcançar ao entrar numa guerra. Quando os objetivos não são claros e quando os planos em relação ao termino do conflito são mínimos, é fácil se perder numa guerra.

“If, as assumed in US war planning doctrine, the outcome of a war is expected to be the opponent’s decisive military defeat, the commander’s main war termination considerations are how to accomplish that defeat and – somewhat secondarily – how to deal with the defeated enemy following his capitulation. That involves more war-fighting planning than war termination planning. Joint doctrine even suggests that war termination criteria cannot be formulated until US forces prevail: “To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution”. (…) In less than ideal circumstances, when the commander is constrained, or his plan frustrated, war termination becomes a very complex matter. If use of force must be limited – for example, by constraints on escalation – or is in some other way rendered ineffective in terms of decisively defeating enemy arms, relating means to ends and ends to means becomes much more complex. Decisions are required. War termination will not take care of itself  (BADE, 1994)”.

A falta de definição de objetivos, ou seja, do que o país que entra em uma guerra pretende alcançar, ou a falta de clareza nesses objetivos é um obstáculo para o planejamento de termino de um conflito. Para decidir quanto parar um conflito, é necessário saber se os custos de continuar lutando são maiores do que os benefícios, para que isso seja possível, é necessário ter clareza de objetivos, inclusive nos casos nos quais é preciso comunicar ao adversário os seus objetivos. Por que é tão difícil definir objetivos claros antes de entrar numa guerra?

“The need to gain domestic support for pursuit of objectives can lead to inflating their importance. That sets in motion a new dynamic: the more important the objective, the more likely it is to drive toward extreme measures. Extreme measures in turn raise the stakes – means begin to determine the ends.

Objectives are often cast in ambiguous terms because credibility suffers if they are not achieved. This same motivation focuses political leaders on avoiding undesirable outcomes rather than on achieving desirable outcomes; negatively cast objectives are not conducive either to offensive military strategies or to war termination.

Confusion can arise when objectives communicated to the opponent are deliberately ambiguous in order to provide negotiating space. The strategist must understand these obstacles to defining objectives in order to overcome them or, failing that, to take them into account in developing war termination strategy.

One other consideration relating to objectives is worth noting. When blood and treasure are invested in a war, that investment itself inevitably becomes part of the stake. It is much more difficult to moderate objectives or to cut losses when blood has been split for the cause. The implications for war termination are obvious (BADE, 1994)”.

Quais os fatores que devem ser levados em consideração para um planejamento de War Termination que não envolvem vitória militar após forte destruição do oponente? A capacidade de demonstrar força militar e intenção de continuar lutando, ações para demonstrar determinação militar (geralmente envolvendo ações pontuais de forte violência), a promessa de destruição do inimigo e fatores organizacionais e comportamentais do inimigo.

“Paul Bracken has suggested that one of the crucial factors in war termination is institutional behavior, the degree to which norm-based behavior substitutes for utilitarian calculation of national interest. Military organizations particularly, but other organizations with rational security responsibilities, as well, rely upon standard procedures, laws, codes of conduct and so forth that substitutes for complex, scenario-dependent calculations. (…) In the same vein, Paul K. Davis noted the effects of stress on human cognition as it relates to those assessments: rigidified thinking, distrust of one’s own judgment, inability to separate trivial from dangerous events, and so forth. This same behavioralist approach reveals other components of decision-making that effect war termination process, including the group dynamics of staffs and knowledge, skills and psychological attributes of key leaders or dominant staff members (BADE, 1994)”.

Em 1992, a Army War College criou uma matrix para descrever o início, o meio e o planejamento quanto ao final de um conflito. Esta ferramenta seria útil para que lideranças civis e militares pudessem visualizar todo o processo do conflito e identificar quais os principais temas envolvidos com o planejamento do fim do conflito e do processo de construção da paz pós-conflito.  Veja abaixo um exemplo desse tipo de matrix (adaptado do artigo “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Sucess”, escrito por William Flavin).


Segurança Número de sistemas Número de sistemas destruídos Número de sistemas restantes Número de sistemas necessários para prevenir agressão
Assistência humanitária Status de pessoas deslocadas Número e localização das pessoas deslocadas Número e localização das pessoas deslocadas e o status delas Estabelecimento de tratamento à longo prazo
Direitos humanos e reconciliação social Status de propriedade de terras Pessoas deslocadas e resultados de hostilidades Status da terra Resolução final quanto a propriedade de terras
Governança e administração civil Status do governo Resultados das hostilidades Status do governo que está emergindo Visão do futuro governo
Direito e ordem civil, segurança pública Status do sistema legal Resultado das hostilidades Análise das polícias, juízes Descrição do sistema objetivo
Infraestrutura, restauração econômica, e transformação Descrição Resultado das hostilidades Avaliação das capacidades Descrição das capacidades objetivos
Diplomacia pública e operações de informações Descrição Temas Avaliação das atitudes Descrição do comportamento

“Successful conflict termination, post-conflict peace operation, and conflict resolution depend on the civil and military leadership recognizing that the end of conflict is as critical as the conduct of war. Mechanisms and organizations should be developed and enabled to synchronize the military, political, economic and informational aspects of the operation as well as harmonizing the interagency, combined, and civilian participants. A civil-military plan needs to be developed that describes the desired end state in sufficient detail so that each of the agencies can develop its supporting plans. Above all, everyone involved must realize that the crystal ball is dark and that end states can shift and develop. Flexibility and adaptability are essential traits (Falvin, 2003)”.


“The intelectual challenge of devising strategies for such limited wars is dauting, and there is Strong appeal in the simplicity of an approach that requires only the expeditious defeat of enemy arms. Attempts to limit a strategy of decisive and complete military victory – or to add other objectives – lead to endless complications. Devising strategies for war termination then takes the strategist from the realm of purely military planning into the behavioral and psychological dimensions of bargaining, game theories, theories of escalation, theories of deterrence, and theories of communication. It is a world of great uncertainties (BADE, 1994)”.
“The crux for American strategists and the focus of any discussion of war termination is the constant tension between the passion needed to go to war and the rational limiting of ends and means. Objectives other than immediate defeat of enemy arms imply a cold-blooded approach to war. That is inimical to American ideals: if the objective is not important enough to employ all the force at our disposal, then it is not important enough to send our sons and daughters into mortal combat. If the passions needed to send soldiers into combat are absent, the populace will not long support the war. This drives American wartime strategy toward early defeat of enemy arms in two ways: passion itself drives effort to the maximum; the need to reach a conclusion before passions subside also drives toward maximum expenditure of effort. There are few motives for limiting the effort or aiming it at objectives which do not contribute directly to defeat of the enemy’s armed forces. (…) Once this last resort to force is decided upon, the nation – however reluctantly – enters another realm in which the principal objective is to remove the anomaly. Military objectives thus surmount all political objectives save defeating the enemy: military strategy is severed from political objectives except in general sense that military victory ultimately permits exercise of political will. The military prosecution of war under such an approach does not have to aim at any particular peace – the definition of the peace is considered quite separately, something to be designed apart from the military prosecution of the war and implemented after cessation of hostilities. It is assumed that if America prevails on the battlefield, a better peace will automatically ensue (BADE, 1994)”.
“The key to successful conflict termination include the following fundamentals: conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states; providing for adequate intelligence and signaling; ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization (Flavin, 2003)”.




Os conflitos entre potências nucleares oferecem um desafio adicional para aqueles responsáveis por planejar o termino de um conflito: até hoje nunca aconteceram guerras nucleares. Logo, é um conflito limitado, ou seja, para o qual não se espera um término tradicional no qual uma potência vence a outra seja através da destruição ou pela provocação de enormes danos no adversário. Mas, o que são guerras limitadas?

“Although the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War were outstanding exceptions, as a generalization it can be argued that wars subsequent to the establishment of the modern international state system (1648) up to the First World War (1914) were limited in character. Limitations were expressed in political objectives, in the conditions of peace imposed by the victors, in the numbers of active combatants, in the weapons employed, and in the restricted involvement of military technology, also served to reduce the probability of transcultural conflict; thus shared value systems probably contributed also to limiting war. International law, especially the “law of war”, moreover, reflected the view that wars should be limited; thus, concepts of belligerency, neutrality, contraband and reprisal were accepted because the international community could “tolerate” war (Dornan et al, 1978)”.

Qual o principal problema enfrentado por aqueles que desejam refletir sobre um processo de finalização de um conflito nuclear?

“A very serious impediment to the development of a theory of nuclear war termination is the problem created by the lack of experience with the use of nuclear weapons in war. Since those weapons have not been utilized in war since the employment of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, any theory which supports to furnish guidelines to the National Command Authority, whether concerned solely with limited nuclear options or with their instrumental utility for war termination, cannot be tested until it is too late to know whether it is of value. Of course, the charges concerning the lack of empirical base and of the use purely deductive methods of reasoning have been made also with regard to nuclear deterrence theory. Deterrence theory, however, does not necessarily have to suffer from these defects. Unlike most past approaches to war termination, it might be possible, by reasoning from plausible analogues, to construct “conditional” deterrence theories which are operationally useful (Dornan et al, 1978)”.

Apesar de eu considerar os termos “conflito nuclear controlado” aparentemente fora da realidade, não existe razão para que Estados não tenham planos para tudo, inclusive para nuclear war termination. Neste sentido, existem hipóteses a respeito de Doutrinas de processos finalização de conflito, muitas das quais tem surgem dentro do contexto de guerra fria. Dornan et al (1978), sugere seis principais pontos fundamentais para uma Doutrina desse tipo. São eles: (1) reconhecimento da relação entre opções nucleares limitadas e war termination; (2) rejeição da distinção artificial entre dissuasão e guerra, e, portanto, menos preocupações de que opções nucleares limitadas poderiam aumentar a probabilidade de guerra nuclear; (3) aceitar a ideia de que guerra nuclear limitada não é mais improvável que outras formas de guerras limitadas; (4) rejeição de noções como “rendição incondicional” e “o único objetivo da guerra é a vitória”; (5) aceitação da ideia de que, não importa o quão impensável, uma guerra nuclear pode acontecer e os Estados Unidos não deveria apostar tudo em doutrinas de dissuasão; e (6) promover estudos sobre o processo de finalização de conflitos nucleares. Olhando em retrospecto para a época da guerra fria, eu fico fascinada ao observar que os Estados têm planos para todos os cenários, até os mais improváveis. Uma pergunta interessante a se fazer após ler esses seis pontos fundamentais é: admitir a ideia de que é possível realizar conflito nucleares limitados num contexto de acirramento diplomático entre duas potências nucleares não deixa o mundo mais inseguro? Afinal, o principal freio do que ficou conhecido como “doutrina MAD” era a ideia de que esta era uma guerra na qual todos iriam perder, logo ninguém jogava os dados sobre a mesa. Ou você, caro leitor, acha que brincar com a possibilidade de opções nucleares limitadas poderia ser usada com mais uma ferramenta de diplomacia acirrada entre potências nucleares sobre um dado assunto de disputa? Ou, seria a guerra da Coreia um indicativo de que é possível uma guerra nuclear controlada, pois as armas nucleares são, essencialmente, armas, e é ridículo acreditar que um país vai ter uma arma em seu arsenal e nunca vai usá-la (leia “Yalu”, escrito por Jorg Friedrich)?

O processo de War Termination, no caso de um conflito nuclear, é definido como o fim (por qualquer razão) do uso de todas as armas nucleares, ou seja, é a transição de um estado de guerra nuclear para um de guerra convencional ou de paz. Tal processo começaria após um cenário de guerra nuclear controlado. Neste cenário, entraria em ação a estratégia de dissuasão nuclear intra-guerra e um plano de finalização de um conflito caracterizado pela negociação dos governos que restaram de ambas as partes. Johnton K. Mark, em seu artigo “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear War Termination, descreve vários cenários de possíveis negociações e o que cada parte envolvida deveria buscar nessas negociações.


“Soviet war termination actions in three important military conflicts prior to World War Two reveal both different techniques of ending hostilities and, perhaps more importantly, different goals from that of total military victory which motivated the USSR in the Second World War. While these conflicts differed both in their scale and potential consequences to Soviet national security from the grave threat of the World War Two German attack, they nevertheless involved substantial numbers of troops and sustained, high-intensity combat. In all three cases – the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Khalkhin Gol “War”, and the Finnish Winter War – hostilities were concluded through means other than the decisive defeat of the adversary by Soviet forces. (…) These foregoing three cases indicate that the USSR has on several occasions terminated conflict through means other than military victory in the traditional manner. They also indicate the important role in such cases of factors not immediate to the conflict itself – the strategic military environment in general, the intervention or threat of intervention by other states, and the existing web of political and diplomatic arrangements with other nations, whose maintenance might be threatened by the war termination mode of total victory (Dornan et al, 1978)”.
“Because they act preeminently with and through words, politicians are prone to misread the scope of feasibility in policy zones that transcend the world of politics. This danger understandably is especially acute in the relations between politics and war. In fact, although all war is political in meaning for all time, it is not an integral branch of politics. Although war should serve politics, war is not strategy noted previously. There is a permanent need for currency conversion between military threat and action and desired political effect (Gray, 2015)”.
“In Western nuclear theory the limitation od deliberate or inadvertent growth in the scope of destruction of a conflict has traditionally been referred to as escalation control. The ability to impose escalation control at each and every level of the escalation ladder has been referred to as escalation dominance. A contemporary view of escalation dominance is that “the defending NATO forces are adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact any quick victory without NATO resort[ing] to nuclear weapons”. With these two perspectives in mind, it is clear that preventing escalation does not fall within the purview of war termination. Although escalation control/dominance is not a component of war termination it must be pointed out that these two concepts are related. The ability of one of the combatants to control the level of destruction would greatly enhance that sides bargaining position in any war termination efforts (Johnston, 1989)”.




Guerras civis são, quase sempre, baseadas em desejo por mudança de regime. Existem três características importantes a respeito de guerras civis que o leitor precisa ter em mente antes de analisar o processo de War Termination neste cenário. Primeiro; guerras civis normalmente duram mais tempo do que guerras entre Estados. Segundo; guerras civis normalmente terminam com a vitória dos rebeldes ou do governo e, quase nunca, através de acordos negociados por ambas as partes. Terceiro; estudos sugerem que negociações para terminar guerras civis quase sempre fracassam quando as negociações chegam em temas como: desarmamento mútuo, integração militar, ou compartilhamento de poder. A raiz de todas as dificuldades que envolver planejar e executar o termino desse tipo de conflito derivam do motivo inicial que normalmente leva à guerra civil: desejo por mudança de regime.

“This observation itself supports the view that civil wars are typically driven by problems of credible commitment. Rebel groups aim at regime change because they could not trust the government to implement the policies they desire even if the government formally agreed to do so. After the rebel group disbands, or after the central government regains strength, or because of monitoring problems arising from the nature of the policy aims (for example, redistribution), the central government would renege on policy concessions it made to end a war. Thus rebel groups must often fight for “all or nothing”. By contrast, the combatants in instate conflict retain their armies after a peace deal, and small changes in territorial control are easily self-enforcing (Fearon & Laitin, 2008).”

O governo sabe que, num cenário de conflito entre os rebeldes e as tropas do governo, existem mais chances de as tropas do governo ganharem. Se é assim, por que o governo simplesmente não usa a sua força militar para acabar de vez com os rebeldes?

“What keeps the government from simply using military force to eliminate the rebels is that conflict is risky and costly. The government is often uncertain about the rebels’ utility for fighting, including their ability to bear the costs of continued fighting in light of different types of support they receive. (…) [Rebel groups] must send a costly signal of their capacity before the government will agree to concessions because the government have strong incentives to only bargain with rebel groups that have the capacity to inflict high level of damage. (…) The risks to the rebels are two-fold. First, if the government is uncertain about the rebels’ utility for fighting, the government may, based on the information they have about the rebels’ expected costs and benefits, make an honest concession to the rebels that the rebels will reject, resulting in a continuation of civil conflict. That is, government offers less than it might be willing to give because it has incorrectly estimated the costs that rebels can bear and the benefits of fighting with the state. Second, if the rebels successfully convince the government that their costs of continued fighting are very low (in an attempt to get more concessions), this may cause the government to prefer continued fighting to bargaining with the rebels. This is because the government may believe that the rebels have an incentive to continue or restart the fight in the future. This bargaining problem can cause the government to forgo making concessions and continue to fight. When the rebels costs to resuming fighting after bargaining are low, the government believes that the rebels will have difficulty agreeing to any present day peace settlement. Knowing this, the government prefers to continue fighting (Sawyer et al, 2015).

Existem fatores que podem influenciar o processo de War Termination de uma guerra civil. Podemos citar como alguns desses fatores: (1) choques de poder relativo ou custos de continuar o conflito estão associados com uma maior probabilidade de termino do conflito, neste caso não por uma acordo entre as partes, mas pela vitória de uma delas (particularmente nos casos em que uma terceira parte apoia um dos lados do conflito ou quando ocorre uma mudança na liderança de uma das partes), (2) apoio de uma parte externa à uma das partes primariamente envolvidas na guerra civil contribui para fim do conflito, exceto quando o apoio externo é dado tanto ao governo quanto aos rebeldes – neste último caso, a guerra civil tende a durar mais tempo, (3) se os rebeldes perderem o apoio externo, a insurgência deles pode rapidamente desaparecer e (4) garantias dadas por terceiros (poderes externos) aumenta as chances de o conflito terminar com um acordo negociado entre as duas partes.

“[The literature of external support in civil war] has focused on the effects of direct external support, including how it can generate a conflict sustaining balance of power between actors, its potential for conflict management, and how third parties can introduce additional veto plyers that make settlement more difficult. These approaches are all rooted in the idea that “support” or a “guarantee” will be in the form of military might (i.e., allocation of troops or direct military intervention (Sawyer et al, 2015).”

Por que uma mudança de liderança em uma das partes envolvidas no conflito civil pode levar ao processo de término de um conflito civil?

“There are several reasons why new leadership is associated with termination. For one, a leader who strongly advocated for war and has identified his or her political fortunes with it may refuse to give up even when it is clear that victory on his or her original terms is very unlikely, since he or she will lose power either way (Goemans 2000). The replacement of such a leader may rise the prospect for war termination by bringing in a new leader without the same baggage.

“Second, some rebel leaders may develop such authoritarian, top-down control of their movements that their capture can render the rest of the group unable to coordinate continued fighting (e.g., Ocalan, or Guzman in Peru). Third, there might be a psychological bias that afflicts leaders in warfare, when they are so focused on victory that they cannot calculate the benefits of cutting losses. Fourth, at least on the government side and in relatively democratic states, new leaders may come to power because the population is fed up with the costs of the conflict and wants to quit or settle. For all these mechanisms, new leadership affords an opportunity for a set of concessions to losers or an admission of defeat by losers that terminates the war (Fearon & Laitin, 2008).”

Então, como levar uma guerra civil (que possui o agravante de sofrer intervenção externa), ao processo de War Termination?

“The existing literature that centers on disarming the rebels at war end focuses largely on the state as the source of bargaining problems that prevent the successful resolution of civil conflict. This article [“The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination” by Sawyer] offers an alternative perspective. If the state expects the rebels’ costs of fighting to decrease (and overall capacity to increase) due to external support, and this external support is large enough relative to the government’s expected value of fighting, continued fighting becomes more desirable to the government than negotiations and concessions. Thus, it is the rebels’ inability to agree not to continue fighting, rather than solely that of the state, that leads to ongoing conflict. (…) Our findings suggest that breaking the link between external supporters and rebels can facilitate settlement, not because it weakens rebels, but because it allows the state to see the rebels as more willing to agree to a peace settlement. More effort, then should be focused on the impact of different types of external support on civil war bargaining and on mechanisms that the international community can employ to help combatants overcome these barriers to civil war settlement (Sawyer et al, 2015).


“Examining several categories of support, we argue that financial support should be the most fungible, as it can be used in diverse ways. Arms transfers are also relatively fungible. Through arms can translate directly into force against the state, they can also be sold or traded for other goods. Moreover, rebels could easily use arms against other targets. Other types of support appear less fungible. Intelligence given to rebels is likely to be contextually relevant, and not necessarily something that can be bartered with in most instances. Troop support from external actors is likely to be un-exchangeable. Troops may come under direction of the rebels, but retain allegiance to the third party and while donated troops may engage in violence against other targets, they are likely constrained by the third party’s agenda. Finally, territorial sanctuary for rebels can be used as a rebel base and for regrouping, but also is unlikely to be transferable or to have a variable effect over time. Rebels have access to sanctuary or they do not. Thus, we can conceptualize categories of limited and highly fungible external support, with financial support being the most fungible of sources of support, arms as fungible and less fungible support including intelligence, troops and territory (Sawyer et al, 2015).




A Doutrina Ameriacana de War Termination é mínima, pois se assume que não se pode planejar o processo de finalização de um conflito até que as forças Americanas ganhem tal conflito, ou seja, para os Americanos primeiro você tem que ganhar a guerra, para depois pensar no processo de finalização do conflito. Contudo, a falta de definição de objetivos, ou seja, do que o país que entra em uma guerra pretende alcançar, ou a falta de clareza nesses objetivos é um obstáculo para o planejamento de termino de um conflito. O processo de War Termination envolve não apenas a clareza dos objetivos ao entrar em um conflito, mas também toda a matrix que envolve os setores de segurança, assistência humanitária, reconciliação social, governança e administração civil, segurança pública, reconstrução da infraestrutura e diplomacia pública. Logo, percebe-se que o processo de finalização de um conflito, ou seja, a resposta para a pergunta “como terminar uma guerra?” envolve não apenas as forças armadas envolvidas no conflito, mas também as autoridades civis envolvidas. Se um país tiver autoridades civis incompetentes e corruptas, dificilmente um plano de finalização de conflito e reconstrução pós-conflito vai dar certo. No texto, eu abordei dois cenários de War Termination, o primeiro que envolvia conflitos nucleares e, o segundo, um cenário de guerra civil. O primeiro é aparentemente datado, mas é um bom exemplo de que os Estados e as forças armadas de qualquer país têm que estar planejadas para todos os tipos de cenário, inclusive os menos factíveis. O segundo é um cenário mais atual, este demonstra que processos de finalização de conflito são essenciais para se entender porque guerras civis duram mais tempo, bem como para se observar como diferentes variáveis envolvidas nesses conflitos se relacionam.



BADE, Bruce C. War Termination: Why Don’t We Plan For It?. National Defense University. National War College. Ano 1994.

POLING, Caitlin. Power and Pretext: The Status of Justice in Thucydides. Ashbrook Statesmanship Thesis. Ano 2009.

FEARON, James D. & LAITIN, David D. Civil war termination. Department of Political Science Stanford University. Ano 2008.

SAWYER, Katherine, CUNNINGHAM, Kathleen Gallagher, REED, William. The Role of External Support in Civil War. University of Maryland. Ano 2015.

FLAVIN, William. Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success. Autuum 2003.

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